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
Mr. Daniel Ellsberg
20752 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, California 90265

Dear Dan:

Here is the Cambodia speech. Thanks to the help of Mel, Paul, Konrad, and Arnold, I think it turned out very well. We'll be calling up the Cambodia amendment sometime fairly soon.

I'll stay in touch.

Best regards,



Andrew von Hirsch
Legislative Counsel
to Senator Goodell

AvH:b
Enclosure

GOODELL

Friday, April 24, 1970

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CAMBODIA: THE COMING OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR
ADDRESS BY
U.S. SENATOR CHARLES E. GOODELL
BEFORE THE
LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
BEVERLY HILTON HOTEL, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA
APRIL 24, 1970

Like some malignant tumor, the war spreads.

Having consumed the living social tissue first of Vietnam and then of Laos, it now turns to feed on Cambodia.

That nation, preserved intact for so many years, has now fallen prey to a conflict that seems as insatiable as it is pointless.

Cambodia now captures the grim headlines of death.

We read of pitched battles in obscure Cambodian provinces, until now as unknown to us as once were the provinces of Vietnam.

We fear these distant places with unfamiliar names may soon become the graveyards of American fighting men.

We observe the inexorable creeping of the war over the border. Behind bland official reassurances, we sense the conflict slipping beyond our control in dread escalation.

We witness the horror that seems to have become the hallmark of this war: massacre.

Replacing scenes of My Lai, our television screens are defiled by visions of hundreds of Vietnamese civilian corpses floating down the Mekong River -- murdered for no other purpose than to satiate the appetite of this Moloch of war. We learn that the contamination of the river by human flesh has become so great as to make the water no longer drinkable -- and to prevent fishermen along its banks from pursuing their ancient trade.

We fear for the lives of an entire race -- of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese farmers and tradesmen who lived in peace for decades in Cambodia, but now may perish in an officially inspired campaign of terror.

We know that in this wider war there can be no victor but death.

I. DIMENSIONS OF THE RISK

Erosion of Cambodian Neutrality

Cambodia for the moment has replaced Vietnam as the powder keg of Indochina.

It is there that the great forces of conflict rush to fill the vacuum left by the departure of Prince Sihanouk and the collapse of Cambodian neutrality.

We read of Vietnamese Communist forces in Cambodia seizing one town after another, advancing ever closer to the capital.

We read of a border increasingly perforated by violence, as South Vietnamese and U.S. forces strain to reach Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

Until last month, Cambodia was a non-aligned state. By a policy of "neutralism" pursued with remarkable success for over a decade, Sihanouk spared his people the horrors of a war that was destroying the rest of Indochina.

Cambodian policy, as formulated by the Prince, was in some respects advantageous to Vietnamese Communist interests. For it gave sanctuary to the enemy's forces along the border and a route into Vietnam for its supplies. Yet that policy also served the clear interest of the United States that the conflict not spread. It prevented a further widening and lengthening of the war -- and the deaths of thousands of young Americans in the jungles of Cambodia.

Weakness of the New Government

Now Prince Sihanouk has been ousted, and embarrassing new friends have taken his place.

The right-wing regime of General Lon Nol has sought -- with disastrous results -- to expel Vietnamese Communist forces from Cambodia. It has fanned the flames of racial hatred, launching a campaign of terror and slaughter against the Vietnamese civilians in the country.

The Cambodian army has proven itself no match for the 40,000 well-trained Communist troops within the country. Rather than helping us, the Cambodian government has become increasingly desperate for our assistance in the face of a deteriorating military situation.

The Cambodian government's ill-fated campaign against the Communist presence has merely led to a widening and strengthening of that presence. While Communist supply lines from Sihanoukville into Vietnam have temporarily been severed, there is little doubt of the enemy's ability to rectify this situation by military action.

Communist forces are now in the position, if they choose, to seize the capital and overthrow the government. Alternatively, they can partition the country -- consolidating their hold over the eastern region, menacing or encircling Pnom Penh, and aiding the Khmer Rouges (Cambodian Communists) in a "national liberation war" in Sihanouk's name.

Risk of U.S. Escalation

In recent testimony, Secretary of State Rogers assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. would maintain a posture of strict neutrality towards Cambodia and bend every effort to avert a widening of the war.

I am sure these sentiments reflect a sincere desire to contain the conflict. Nevertheless, there is real danger that, because of purely military exigencies in the field, the United States will find itself pulled into the morass inch by inch against the better judgment of its leaders.

We see clear signs of this process already, as we read almost daily of offensives over the border by South Vietnamese forces -- planned and encouraged by U.S. military advisers. Still more ominous, we hear reports of "protective reaction" sallies by U.S. units, and "protocol visits" of obvious military intent by American officers.

We observe frightening parallels between these developments and the early stages of Vietnam, when American advisers supposedly were prohibited from accompanying Vietnamese units on combat missions.

We see risks of a secret war inside the Cambodian border, as for five years a secret war raged in northern Laos.

It is illusion to imagine that -- short of the most massive escalation -- allied military action across the border, by land or air, can eliminate Communist sanctuaries or erode their strength. The military pressure that failed to disturb Viet Cong sanctuaries within 30 miles of Saigon is not likely to prove more successful against Communist encampments along the heavily forested Cambodian boundary. Moreover, even if with enormous effort Communist units were dislodged from their base camps along the border, they simply could move deeper into Cambodia.

If the United States continues to permit or encourage South Vietnamese units to attack Communist bases in Cambodia, they sooner or later will require U.S. air or ground support to avoid defeat. Communist forces in Cambodia can respond to these South Vietnamese initiatives, moreover, by hastening their advance upon Pnom Penh.

These developments, in turn, will induce China and Russia to line up behind an aggressive North Vietnamese strategy in Cambodia. And they will place the United States under still greater pressure to intervene to save a worsening situation.

Such escalation would be as absurd as it would be tragic -- for the United States has no vital interest in the preservation of the Cambodian government by force of arms.

II. THE ADMINISTRATION POLICY

The President's Speech

On Monday, President Nixon spoke again on Vietnam.

He announced the return of 150,000 American troops during the next year -- in itself a commendable decision.

Yet the withdrawal will leave nearly 300,000 men in

Vietnam in the beginning of the third year of the Nixon Administration. A presence of this size confirms that the United States will long continue to be heavily involved in Vietnam.

The President's decision to retain a force of this magnitude in the beginning of 1971 confirms the prediction I made in testimony this February before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And as I warned in that testimony, it could involve a price within the next three years of 5,000 to 20,000 Americans dead, 20,000 to 100,000 Americans wounded, and \$40 to \$60 billion wasted.

And the President left all his options open.

He made no firm commitment for any pullouts within the next four months. This leaves him with the alternative of temporarily reducing or even freezing troop withdrawals, as some of his military advisers have urged. He also retains the option of changing the plan if the enemy escalates further.

He acknowledged that the war had taken the dimensions of an Indochina conflict.

Yet, in a stunning omission, he offered no assurance against the United States' extending its military involvement into Cambodia.

Even more disturbing, he broadened his earlier warnings against increased enemy activity -- by applying them to Cambodia and Laos; he said:

"Again I remind the leaders of North Vietnam that... they will be taking grave risks if they attempt to use the occasion to jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam by increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Laos."

This, perhaps, is the most deeply disturbing aspect of his speech.

There is no reason to suppose the enemy will be deterred by this threat of reprisal when it was not deterred by the actual reprisals of the Johnson Administration.

After making this threat, what choice is open to the President if the Communists elect to continue an offensive course in Cambodia?

He has three unpalatable choices.

He can slow down or halt American withdrawal from Vietnam. This merely prolongs American casualties and costs -- without effectively deterring the enemy. Extending the American presence in Vietnam does not stop the enemy from continuing its advance in Cambodia.

He can carry out his threat by moving American ground or air forces across the Cambodian border. This could only plunge us deeper into the morass.

He can back down from his threat and continue the withdrawals. This, while certainly the wisest course, would present obvious problems for the credibility of his policy.

Failure of Vietnamization

The President continued to paint a roseate picture of Vietnamization.

Yet the recent developments in Cambodia and Laos have demonstrated the failure of Vietnamization -- and the President has implicitly admitted this failure by tying his Vietnamization program to events in Cambodia and Laos.

Vietnamization was conceived and advertised as an ingenious method for backing into success; for narrowing and winding down the war on our terms; for partially extricating ourselves while deterring further Communist "aggression" in Southeast Asia.

The assumptions of this scheme have already crumbled. They deserve to be consigned to the historical scrapheap along with "strategic hamlets," "hearts and minds" and other relics of our Vietnam policy.

At enormous cost of lives and money, the Administration labored to build a strategy to prop up the sagging forces of our South Vietnamese allies and forestall the Communist advance in South Vietnam. Erroneously conceiving of the war as purely a Vietnamese struggle, it imagined this would represent at least temporary success. It overlooked the obvious fact that the war had become an Indochina conflict. It forgot that the enemy could compensate for being temporarily stalemated in Vietnam by taking the initiative in Cambodia and Laos -- where it clearly has the military advantage.

Where do the Communist initiatives in Laos and Cambodia leave the United States with its much-advertised Vietnamization strategy?

It leaves us with the unhappy prospect of a wider war, fought at increasing sacrifice for diminishing objectives.

It leaves us with a strategy that has, in Senator Fulbright's apt words, become a political Maginot Line -- difficult for the enemy to assault head on, but why bother, when they can walk around it?

From a strictly military standpoint, the United States might seek to sever Vietnamization from developments elsewhere in Indochina -- to press forward with the war in South Vietnam while permitting events to take their course in Laos and Cambodia. The purely military problems of such a strategy are the familiar ones: the flow of Communist supplies through Laos and Cambodia and the sanctuary of Communist troops in Cambodia.

Such a strategy would be the lesser folly, compared with seeking to widen the conflict into Laos and Cambodia. It would be the lesser madness compared to a return to the disastrous course of escalation. Folly it would remain, however.

What is the point of squandering thousands more American lives, hundreds of thousands more Vietnamese lives, and billions more American dollars in the elusive pursuit of military success in South Vietnam, if the rest of Indochina is at the mercy of the enemy?

What is the point of huge efforts to capture this or that Communist hamlet in South Vietnam, when the enemy can easily respond by seizing the capital of Cambodia?

Historically, the prime objective of the enemy has been South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese can, however, easily shift the initiative to Laos and Cambodia, if they are momentarily blocked in South Vietnam, and if such a shift will embarrass the United States. This appears to be the current enemy strategy.

If that is the enemy strategy, how has Vietnamization deterred the Communist "aggression" in Southeast Asia of which the President so often speaks?

What have we achieved if Vietnamization can at best create no more than an isolated South Vietnamese bastion in a hostile Indochina, and at worst collapse from the internal weakness of the South Vietnamese army and government?

In Vietnamization, we have found the perfect bad bargain. Our losses in lives, treasure and opportunities foregone are guaranteed. Our gains are doubtful of achievement, and diminish daily in value.

The Geneva Conference

In his speech, the President appeared to show some interest in the French proposal for a new Geneva conference on Indochina -- despite the rejection of the idea by the Viet Cong, and the apparent change in the Russian attitude from support to hesitancy.

Certainly, we should stand ready to negotiate in any forum.

Whether in Paris or Geneva, however, negotiations are not likely to make much progress unless the United States alters its basic premises for bargaining.

As everyone concedes, the Paris talks are bogged down. The North Vietnamese will not negotiate without a firm commitment by the United States for a complete and rapid disengagement of its forces. The United States refuses to give an unconditional commitment of this nature. The President spoke on Monday only of an "eventual" withdrawal of all American troops -- and that conditioned on the pullout of all North Vietnamese forces and assurance they will not return. Meanwhile, plans go forward for the retention of a residual force of American troops for an indefinite period until Vietnamization succeeds.

In any Geneva conference, the sticking point will remain the presence of U.S. troops in Vietnam. As long as the stalemate on this fundamental issue continues, little of substance will be accomplished by shifting the site of the talks from Paris to Geneva, broadening the agenda to consider the neutralization of all Indochina, and adding a few more nations as participants. or: GVN?

We must bear in mind that North Vietnam conducts its operations in Laos and Cambodia largely in order to assist its objectives in South Vietnam. As long as American troops remain indefinitely committed in South Vietnam, we can expect the North Vietnamese to maintain pressure on Laos and Cambodia as a means of raising the military and political costs of that presence. In these circumstances, the enemy has little or no incentive for negotiating the withdrawal of their troops from Laos and Cambodia.

If the United States were to decide to change its position on the basic issue of its continued military presence -- as I long have urged it should -- an environment may be created for truly fruitful talks, either at Paris or Geneva.

? GVN?

If it does not, a new Geneva conference entails the risk of raising hopes for peace that would too soon be dashed -- and of diverting our attention from the fundamental task of complete U.S. disengagement.

The Guam Doctrine

At Guam, President Nixon established the principle that the Asian nations with which we are allied must bear the primary responsibility of providing manpower for their own defense.

Had this principle been applied in Vietnam in 1963, as it should have been, we never would have become embroiled in a land war to preserve a government unable to defend itself.

Had this principle been applied in Laos in 1969, as it should have been, we never would have become embroiled in an escalating air war over that nation.

or is this

Doctrine:

airpower?

The Nixon Doctrine makes little sense if it is applied -- as it seems to have been in Laos -- only to restrict intervention by ground combat troops, leaving all other forms of military escalation unchecked.

Our bitter experience in Indochina demonstrates that one form of direct military involvement inevitably leads to the next; that there are no "safe" military activities -- whether they be the dispatch of military advisers or the provision of air support -- that can be neatly segmented from "unsafe" ground intervention.

I suggest that the Guam doctrine is a sound doctrine -- but it is sound only if it is applied rigorously and systematically. To work, it must recognize that intervention is a continuous process -- so that if the doctrine leads us to rule out the conduct of a land war in an Asian nation, it must also rule out the other forms of intervention which lead up to such a war.

III. NON-INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA

The Goodell Amendment

I believe the Congress must act now to prevent our nation from becoming embroiled in a war in Cambodia, as it already is in the rest of Indochina.

Accordingly, I shall introduce an amendment to appropriate legislation on the Senate floor, barring any American military intervention in Cambodia.

The amendment will be drawn to prohibit the entry of American military personnel into or over Cambodia for any purpose and for any period of time. It would also preclude the entry of camouflaged military personnel -- Americans actually serving as military advisers but operating under cover identities as embassy employees, AID officials, etc.

TOO LATE!

The amendment will have the following effects:

1) It will prohibit U.S. military personnel in Vietnam from temporarily crossing the Cambodian border for any purpose. This would forbid not only "protective reaction" or "hot pursuit" strikes, but also "protocol" visits across the border by American military advisers of the kind that have recently been reported.

to a "protocol state"!

2) It will forbid the dispatch of U.S. military advisers to Cambodia for aiding Lon Nol government forces.

3) It will preclude the extension of the air war into Cambodia, whether by bombing, tactical air support, or other air support missions.

4) Finally, it will forbid the introduction or maintenance in Cambodia of any American troops, whether combat forces, support forces or logistical units.

The legislation will serve not only to prevent the sort of U.S. ground escalation that occurred in Vietnam six years ago, but also to avoid the sort of escalation by proxy that has occurred in Laos -- where our nation has permitted itself to become increasingly embroiled in an air war and in the tactical support of a local guerrilla war.

2E Last October, I introduced the "Vietnam Disengagement Act" (S. 3000) to extricate this nation from a hopeless and brutalizing war which by then had killed or wounded over a quarter of a million Americans and taken the lives of over a million Vietnamese. I am now making this proposal, in order to make certain that no "Cambodian Disengagement Act" will ever be needed to extricate ourselves from a widened and deepened Indochina conflict.

We stand at the crossroads in Cambodia, as we did in Vietnam a decade ago. We made the wrong choice then. The legislation I am proposing will prevent us from making the wrong choice now.

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It recognizes that the interests of the United States in Indochina cannot conceivably justify the commitment of American forces and the loss of American lives in Cambodia. It recognizes that a widening of the war into Cambodia inevitably means its prolongation -- inevitably defers the end of the Indochina conflict.

It safeguards this nation against being sucked into a war in Cambodia by small stages, against its will.

It accords with the new Cambodian government's own protestations of neutrality and its condemnation of the entry of any foreign troops on Cambodian soil.

It makes clear that the United States will not intervene in any Cambodian conflict, whether it involves indigenous anti-government forces or the Vietnamese Communist forces that have sanctuary within the country.

It serves as a deterrent against continued South Vietnamese attacks across the Cambodian border. It places the Saigon government on notice that further incursions into Cambodian territory will be at its own risk and peril -- that it cannot rely upon the customary U.S. air and logistical support, and cannot hope for rescue by U.S. forces if its Cambodian operations succumb to defeat. This deterrent can and should be

strengthened, however, by clear instructions from the Commander-in-Chief prohibiting American units or advisers from providing direct logistical or other support to South Vietnamese units that make forays into Cambodia -- even where the American personnel remain on the Vietnamese side of the border.

It is, above all, the ounce of prevention. It permits Congress and the President to make the rational choice in Cambodia before any commitments have been made to limit that choice. It would prevent another Vietnamese or Laotian disaster before the disaster is upon us.

The commitment of American troops in a foreign conflict is a responsibility that, under the Constitution, the President shares with the Congress. The enactment of this bill would assure that this responsibility is thus shared. Should the President, as the result of any new developments, conceivably wish to present further proposals for the utilization of American military personnel in Cambodia, he would be required to obtain the specific authorization of Congress before taking such action.

Church-Cooper Amendment

Senators Church and Cooper have announced that they will introduce an amendment that will prohibit the entry of U.S. ground combat forces into Cambodia.

The amendment, if adopted, would have symbolic value in demonstrating the concern of Congress over the spreading of the war.

The amendment is deficient, however, in that it covers only the terminal stage of escalation -- ground combat. It provides no protection against the critical earlier stages of escalation -- against the process that begins with American sallies across the border and continues with the provision of military advisers, logistical and air support, bombing, etc.

Designed to prevent the full-scale ground war in Vietnam from spreading to Cambodia, it does not preclude the sort of proxy war that is being waged in Laos from spreading to Cambodia.

The amendment is modelled after an earlier amendment by Senators Mansfield, Church and Cooper prohibiting the entry of U.S. ground troops into Laos, which Congress adopted last December.

That amendment, however, was enacted when the disease of escalation in Laos had already passed its initial stages -- when the U.S. was heavily embroiled in the support of a guerilla army and a full-scale air war against North Vietnamese forces.

In Cambodia, the disease is still in its incipient stages. To prevent it from going further, it is essential to adopt preventive legislation that would bar all forms of military intervention, from the most tentative to the most ambitious. My amendment would accomplish this purpose.

Military Aid to Cambodia

The United States now provides no military hardware to Cambodia. Such aid was terminated by Prince Sihanouk in 1963, as part of an effort to reassure North Vietnam and China of Cambodia's neutrality and friendship. The Cambodian army since then has been primarily outfitted with Chinese and Soviet weapons.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Secretary of State Rogers stated that he did not anticipate a request for aid by the Lon Nol government.

Its losing battle with Vietnamese Communist forces has, however, made the new Cambodian regime increasingly desperate for military aid from the United States. This week, Premier Lon Nol sent an urgent appeal to the President requesting arms and equipment. And the State Department has opened exploratory talks on military assistance with Cambodian authorities.

For several reasons, I am strongly opposed to the United States' resuming military aid to Cambodia.

The basic military fact in Cambodia is that the Vietnamese Communist forces within the country are substantially stronger than the forces of the central government.

This military preponderance on the Communist side cannot, I believe, be rectified merely by supplying modern American military equipment to the inadequate Cambodian army. Military aid to Cambodia will only put pressure on Washington to dispatch American advisers to assist Cambodian forces in making use of the equipment they have received. Such aid may, in fact, worsen the plight of the hard-pressed Cambodian forces -- if the Communists retaliate by a still swifter advance on the capital.

Moreover, U.S. military aid to Cambodia may be used for purposes not consistent with American objectives. One such likely purpose is the systematic murder of Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia.

Both in Laos and in Vietnam, a massive military aid program failed to shore up failing local forces, and proved the forerunner of more direct forms of American involvement. The same pattern could easily recur in Cambodia.

Cambodia faces severe economic problems that might justify the granting of U.S. economic aid if requested. Such aid may be provided, however, without taking the hazardous concomitant step of granting military assistance.

Conclusion

It is time we recognize that the Indochina war has not been and cannot ever be won.

It is time we recognize that we cannot build an Asian society at gunpoint.

It is time we recognize that the human, economic and other costs of prolonging our military presence in Indochina clearly outweigh any benefits that could conceivably result from our presence.

It is time we swiftly and completely terminate our involvement in a hopeless and evil war.

It is time we adopt a sane policy in Indochina -- not one that at staggering human sacrifice, pursues the chimerical goal of Vietnamization -- followed perhaps by Cambodianization.